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Abstract: 
Marginal income taxes may have an insurance effect by decreasing the effective fluctuations 
of after-tax individual income. By compressing the idiosyncratic component o personal 
income fluctuations, higher marginal taxes should be negatively correlated with the dispersion 
of consumption across households, a necessary implication of an insurance effect of taxation. 
Our study empirically examines this negative correlation, exploiting the ample variation of 
state taxes across US states. We show that taxes are negatively correlated with the 
consumption dispersion of the within-state distribution of non-durable consumption and that 
this correlation is robust. 
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Much analysis of household consumption focuses on the study of choices made by forward-
looking wealth-accumulating agents who face exogenous uninsurable idiosyncratic labor-
income shocks and liquidity constraints.1 Incorporating this partial-equilibrium consumer
problem into workable simulation/calibration models of the macro economy that explic-
itly allow for heterogenous agents has become standard ever since the pioneering work by
Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Critical policy issues arise from the
inclusion of idiosyncratic risk. Bewley (1986) shows that, in these models, idiosyncratic risk
implies that markets are incomplete and agents face the probability of not being able to
smooth consumption through borrowing. Hence the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto
e±cient. Consequently, distortionary income taxes might improve welfare, because they di-
rectly compress the spread of uncorrelated idiosyncratic income shocks a-priori. In other
words, marginal income taxes may have an insurance e®ect by decreasing the e®ective °uc-
tuations of after-tax individual income, a point also made in an earlier literature by Mirrlees
(1974) and Varian (1980). Consistent with these ideas, Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2006),
calibrate a heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic risk and ¯nd that optimal tax rates
are positive and sizeable.
In any idiosyncratic earnings risk model where consumer goods are normal, with or
without labor/savings distortions, the insurance e®ect of marginal income taxation would
1For example, Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), Hubbard, Skinner, Zeldes (1995), and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) o®er supporting evidence that some combination of precautionary saving and/or liquidity
constraints can be important determinants of saving and consumption dynamics.
3imply that higher taxes decrease the standard deviation of consumption across households.
The traditional approach without idiosyncratic risk has emphasized the distortionary e®ect
of taxes which reduces average consumption and reduces welfare. The more recent litera-
ture, in which agents face uninsured idiosyncratic risk, demonstrates the insurance e®ect of
redistributive taxes which reduces each household's consumption variability and can raise
welfare.2 The relative importance of these two e®ects is crucial for the evaluation of ¯scal
policy. Hence it is important to empirically test whether the distortionary and insurance
e®ects of redistribution through the tax and bene¯t system can indeed be observed in the
data. Testing for these e®ects is therefore the aim of this study.3
Performing our task requires using household data to construct aggregate measures of the
tax system, and of the distribution of consumption. One possibility is to investigate house-
holds in di®erent countries. However, we believe that cross-country variation in the key
variables may re°ect di®erences in institutional, cultural and other country-speci¯c features,
as well as di®erences in the measurement of the appropriate household level variables in dif-
ferent national surveys. Moreover, the design of these household surveys di®ers substantially
among countries, making it di±cult to construct consistent measures of consumption and of
the tax system across countries.
Rather than use di®erences across countries, we exploit di®erences across US states to
2Floden (2001) provides a clear evaluation of the welfare e®ects showing the tradeo® between distortions
and insurance.
3A transfer system is not necessary for higher marginal taxation to generate a more compressed distri-
bution. Elmendorf and Kimball (2000) show in a partial equilibrium model how realistic increases in labor
income marginal tax rates can cause large reductions in after-tax labor income risk.
4investigate the relationship between marginal taxation and the observed within-state variance
of consumption. The di±culties highlighted above are likely to be much less important for
US states since, in measuring taxes or consumption, the same survey can be exploited for all
households in the sample. Using the same survey across tax regimes reduces the chance that
di®erences in survey design spuriously generate the di®erent measured policy responses.
An obvious problem with working with states (or regions) from the same country has to
do with the extent of variation in levied taxes according to state tax legislation. The lower
the variation, the harder to identify the e®ect of taxes on the distribution of consumption.
Therefore, our identi¯cation strategy requires showing that there is enough variation in
state-level taxes and that using observations from di®erent US states o®ers an appropriate
\laboratory" in which to assess the e®ect of taxes on consumption. Accordingly, we show
that there is surprisingly substantial variation both in levels and in the time evolution of state
taxes. Another problem may be the fact that households ¯nd it easier to move between US
states than between countries. But this easier mobility makes more di±cult to demonstrate
the insurance e®ect of marginal income taxation on the distribution of consumption, making
our investigation challenging.
We utilize household consumption data for 24 years from the American Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey (CEX) to compute the mean and the standard deviation of log non-durable
consumption by year and state. To construct our measure of a state's marginal income tax
rate we use the TAXSIM model, as provided by the NBER.4 The model is run on house-
hold income data as supplied by the Statistics of Income Division (SOI) of the Internal
4Details on the TAXSIM model can be found in Freenberg and Coutts (1993).
5Revenue Service (IRS) and computes the marginal tax rate on state net of federal taxes
for several income factors, including labor, interest, dividend and pension income. The
marginal tax rate is averaged by state and year and made available through the web at
http://www.nber.org/taxsim. There are three reasons for using the mean marginal tax rate
based on IRS data as provided by the NBER. First, IRS data are less likely to be a®ected by
measurement error compared to survey data.5 Second, using consumption and taxes from
di®erent sources makes measurement error across the two measures to be uncorrelated and
avoids problems of possible spurious correlation. Third, the NBER provides a series for
the mean marginal tax rate computed holding the income distribution ¯xed, which allows
us to distinguish the e®ect of cross-state di®erences in the state legislation from cross-state
di®erences in the income distribution.
We ¯nd evidence that higher marginal tax rates are negatively correlated with the stan-
dard deviation of non-durable consumption. The conclusions are robust to unobserved het-
erogeneity at the state level and to expanding the speci¯cation to include variables that vary
both across states and over time, such as the unemployment rate, and to the use of instru-
mental variables, for labor-earnings, interest/dividend, and pension income. We therefore
¯nd compelling evidence supporting the presence of an insurance e®ect of taxes in the US.
Demonstrating the insurance e®ect means it is important to stress the appropriate policy
tradeo®s (between the distortionary and insurance e®ects) in models of taxes which incor-
5The IRS data are virtually the overall population data of US non-corporate tax payers. The SOI division
does not reveal the state of residence for taxpayers with annual gross income greater than $200,000 (nominal).
The number of such taxpayers by state is available for most years since 1989, and used to impute states for
high income taxpayers. More details can be found at www.nber.org/taxsim.
6porate idiosyncratic risk. Yet, we do not ¯nd robust evidence supporting the distortionary
e®ect of taxation. The negative correlation between unconditional mean consumption and
marginal taxation does not persist under the same robustness tests we run for the insurance
e®ect.
In Section 2 we describe the data and compare the tax system in di®erent US states. We
present the empirical ¯ndings and provide robustness checks in Section 3, while we make
concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 Data
2.1 Consumption
Since our empirical exercise exploits cross-state di®erences in the evolution of state taxation
we need to measure the yearly mean and standard deviation of consumption for each US
state. To construct the standard deviation of consumption requires household-level data.
We use CEX data from 1980 to 2003.
The CEX is a household level survey, run on a yearly basis by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) for computing the weights for the American Consumer Price Index. The
CEX has detailed information on individual expenditure items, as well as on a variety of
household characteristics. This allows us to construct a measure of non-durable consump-
tion that includes food and beverages, tobacco, housekeeping services, fuel, public utilities,
repairs, public transport, personal care, entertainment, clothing, and books. More details
on the CEX survey can be found in Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2005).
7The survey is made of two components, the Interview and the Diary survey; here, we
use the Interview survey. This is made of four interviews for each household, in which the
respondent is asked to report the expenditures in the 3 months before the interview month.
In order to keep the sampling error low we include only those states with at least 200
observations per year. Because state information is sometimes suppressed for con¯dentiality
reasons, we exclude Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming, from our sample.6
We de°ate consumption data by the Consumer Price Index in order to convert nominal
values into real ones. To account for di®erences in the family structure across US states we
divide non-durable consumption by the OECD equivalence scale. This assigns a value of
1 to the ¯rst household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child.
To further control for cross-state di®erences in demographic composition, we regress non-
durable consumption on a cubic polynomial in age, education, family-size, race, and marital
status and construct group averages from the residuals. Nevertheless, we ¯nd that omitting
these ¯rst stage controls does not a®ect our results.
2.2 Household Taxes
US households pay taxes on earned and unearned income, as well as sales and property taxes.
We concentrate on income taxes and exclude sales and property taxes. Sales taxes are paid
6By comparing the sample for which we have state information with the sample for which we do not have
state information, we ¯nd that the share of male household heads in the missing state information sample
is comparable to that in the non-missing information sample (71% versus 70%). Moreover, in both of these
subsamples the average age is 47.5, the family size 2.5 persons, and the number of kids 0.7.
8at the place of sale rather than residence, making di±cult to measure the sales taxes levied
on households within the state if cross-border shopping takes place. In the CEX, the spend-
ing ¯gure excludes sales taxes, so that expenditure is comparable across states. Property
taxes are largely levied at the county/schoolboard/city level. Therefore, the property tax
legislation may be very diverse within each state depending on the locality where the house-
holds resides. Moreover, the e®ects of property taxes on aggregate consumption moments
are not obvious, and we are not aware of models that make unambiguous predictions. Po-
tential complications include the nonlinearities induced by the tax deductibility of mortgage
payments, the endogenous nature of the decision between being a renter or a home owner
and whether consumption and housing are separable in the utility function.
Constructing a single measure of a marginal tax rate in each state is not trivial and
entails addressing a number of problems. Income tax systems can be complicated since not
only do di®erent households face di®erent tax rates, and there is also considerable variation
in tax rates across jurisdictions. Table 1 illustrates the wide variation in state marginal tax
rates and exemptions across states. It shows that several states, including Texas and Florida,
do not levy any income taxes on their residents while New Hampshire and Tennessee only
charge tax on dividend and interest income. The other states have a variety of income tax
bands and exemptions (or tax credits) that are applicable. Although some states, such as
Massachusetts and Illinois, have a °at rate income tax, in most states, the marginal tax
rate increases with income. The di®erence between the highest and lowest marginal tax
rate can sometimes be large. In Iowa the lowest marginal tax rate is 0.36% and the highest
is 8.98, while several states have marginal tax rates even higher for the highest earning
9households. There are also, typically, a variety of tax allowances to which households are
entitled. While there is no tax exempt income in Pennsylvania, up to $24,000 of income is
exempt from state income tax in Connecticut for married couples. However, Connecticut
allows no exempt income for other dependents, in contrast to Minnesota which allows the
same exempt level of income for the earner, their partner, and each other dependent.
To construct each household's income tax burden, we exploit the TAXSIM 8.0 program
developed by Freenberg (see Freenberg and Coutts, 1993, for details), provided by the NBER
and run on the IRS data. Using a variety of household variables, including a husband's and
wife's earnings, interest, dividends and other income, and information about the household's
characteristics (such as the number of dependant children) and other deductibles (like prop-
erty costs) as well as the year and state of residence, the program calculates both the state
and the federal tax liability, and the marginal tax rates, explicitly controlling for a variety
of allowances.
2.3 The cross-state marginal-tax variation
We use the mean marginal tax rate for state taxes on labor, interest, dividend and pension
income. Such marginal tax rates are computed at the NBER running the TAXSIM model on
the household income data as supplied by the SOI division of the IRS. The NBER provides
marginal state (net of federal taxes) as well as marginal combined state and federal income
taxes. We use the former, since the latter confounds our identi¯cation strategy by mixing
the e®ect of state and federal tax legislation on household tax burden.
Table 2 averages over time the state marginal tax rates and their changes for each US
10state. This table con¯rms that there is substantial variation across states both in the level
and in the dynamics of marginal tax rates. Marginal state taxes are zero in Alaska, Florida,
Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wyoming, but
are positive in all other states. Moreover, the marginal state taxes on labor ranges from
2.5% in Pennsylvania to 8.7% in the District of Columbia. The ranking is similar for interest
and dividend income. The former ranges from 2.5 in Pennsylvania, to 8.2 in the DC, the
latter from 2.5 to 7. The ordering among US states is somewhat di®erent if one looks at the
state marginal rate on pension income. Hawaii is among the states with the lower marginal
tax rate (below 1%) but also features a very high marginal tax rates on the other income
sources (8.4 on labor, 7.7 on interest, 7.9 on dividend income).
The changes reported in Table 2 reveal that there are also substantial di®erences in the
time evolution of the marginal state taxes. The marginal tax rate on labor and interest
income has decreased by almost 3% in Delaware between 1980 and 2003 and by 5.54 and
4.4% in Connecticut. The state marginal tax rate on dividend interest has decreased for most
states and increased by 2 and 4% for Kentucky and Massachusetts, respectively; that on
pension income had decreased by 1.7% for Kentucky and increased by 4.9% for Connecticut.
The variation in the state marginal tax rate is driven by variation in the state legislation
as well as by variation in the state income distribution. To distinguish the former source of
variation from the latter, the NBER computes the state marginal tax rates assuming that the
distribution of income is constant across states and over time. Speci¯cally, the distribution
of income in each state is assumed to be equal to the national distribution of income in 1995.
In Figure 1 we present a US state thematic map. Each state is colored according to the
11state tax legislation: states featuring lower marginal tax rates on labor income over the years
1980-2003 are darker. Figure 1 displays ample variation in state tax legislation on earned
income. This is con¯rmed in Figures 2, 3 and 4, which refer to state marginal tax rates on
interest, dividend and pension income.
Furthermore, Figures 1 through 4 show that holding the distribution of income ¯xed little
a®ects the across states ordering of state marginal tax rates and their evolution, and leaves
the overall picture unchanged. The state of DC now features the third highest rate on labor
(7.9%), the second on interest (7.6%), and the highest on dividend and pension income (8.3
and 7.8%, respectively), and Hawaii is the state with the highest rates on labor and interest
income, 8.4 and 7.7% respectively.
The evolution of state legislation is analyzed in Figures 5 through 8. These ¯gures show
the changes in the state marginal tax rates on labor, interest, dividend and pension income,
holding ¯xed the income distribution. The solid line stemming from the center of each state
means that the marginal tax rate has increased between 1980 and 2003, the dotted that it
has decreased; lines are longer, the larger the change in absolute value. Figures 5 through
8 show that in most states the marginal tax rate has changed, but at a di®erent extent. In
Connecticut the marginal tax rate on labor income has increased by 5.5, and in Delaware
has decreased by 2.6 percentage points. The US states also display noticeable di®erences in
the time evolution of the marginal tax rates on interest, dividend and pension income. In
Massachusetts, the marginal tax rates on interest and dividend income have increased by 4.3
and 4.5 percentage points respectively, while in Delaware they have decreased by 2.65 and
3.8 percentage points.
123 The Empirical Evidence
The substantial variation of tax regimes across US states and over time allows us to show
how the mean and standard deviation on non-durable consumption are related to marginal
taxes. Figures 9 and 10 plot the marginal tax rate on labor income against the mean and
standard deviation of log non-durable consumption.7 For both the mean and the standard
deviation of log non-durable consumption, we have also ¯tted a regression line through the
observations. The line is downward sloping in both graphs, which means that the mean and
the standard deviation of non-durable consumption are negatively related to taxes.
The regressions underlying Figures 9 and 10 are reported in Table 3. The association
between the mean of log non-durable consumption and taxes is negative for all income
factors, and statistically signi¯cant at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level for labor, interest and
pension income taxes and not signi¯cant for dividend income. Taxes are negatively related
to within-state consumption dispersion: the coe±cient on labor income marginal tax rate is
signi¯cant at the 5% level, that on interest, dividend and pension income marginal tax rate
at the 0.1%.
Our marginal income tax measure depends on the actual income distribution within each
state. The same average marginal tax rate might result from very di®erent income distri-
butions, which biases the results against ¯nding e®ects of taxes on consumption moments.
Moreover, cross-state variation in the average marginal tax rates might be driven mainly by
di®erences in the income distribution rather than by di®erences in the state tax legislation.
7The ¯gures for the marginal tax rates on interest, dividend and pension income are similar and we do
not report them for brevity.
13To account for the possibility that di®erences in the income distribution might lie behind our
results, we regress the mean and the standard deviation of log-nondurable consumption on
the average marginal tax rates on labor interest, dividend- and pension income, computed
holding the income distribution ¯xed over time and across states.8 The results are reported
at the bottom part of Table 3 and con¯rm the negative association between taxes and the
mean and the standard deviation of log non-durable consumption.
The simple regressions reported in Table 3 neglect a number of issues. First, there
might be di®erences across states that might obscure or amplify the e®ects of taxes on
consumption moments. Such di®erences might depend on di®erences in the population
composition across states and might not be orthogonal to the marginal tax rates. Second,
business cycle e®ects jointly a®ect income and consumption, and therefore have the potential
to lie behind the association between taxes and consumption moments. Third, state speci¯c
time-varying income risks might a®ect the consumption dispersion, and to the extent that tax
variables proxy for these, one ¯nds a negative association between consumption dispersion
and taxes, which has nothing to do with the insurance e®ect of taxation. Fourth, taxes
and consumption might be jointly determined and therefore our estimates are a®ected by a
standard endogeneity problem. The rest of this section addresses these issues.
3.1 The insurance e®ect of taxation
To account for the cross-state di®erences in the composition of population within each state
and for the e®ect of unobservable variables that might be correlated with taxes, we use a
8As we discussed in Section 2, we use the 1995 nationwide income distribution.
14¯xed e®ect within-group estimator in the regression of consumption dispersion on taxes. The
results are reported in the second column of Table 4. In comparison with the ¯rst, which
displays the results for the baseline speci¯cation, the second column shows that the e®ect of
taxes on consumption dispersion is larger if one uses the ¯xed e®ect estimator. This suggests
that failing to control for permanent di®erences across US states might obscure the e®ect of
taxes on consumption dispersion.
The third column of Table 4 adds year dummies to the second column speci¯cation.
Year dummies take care of business cycle e®ects, which jointly a®ect income, taxes and
consumption. The results con¯rm that consumption dispersion is negatively related to taxes,
which we view as evidence of the insurance e®ect of taxation. Business cycle e®ects might
actually be state-speci¯c and come in the form of time-varying income risk, which is due
to a®ect the consumption distribution. To proxy for state-speci¯c business cycle e®ects
we use the state unemployment rate, which we add to our regression. The results are
reported in the fourth column of Table 4 and show that there is a positive relationship
between the unemployment rate and consumption dispersion. This accords with the idea
that a high unemployment rate entails high income risk, which in turn is associated with
high consumption dispersion. The coe±cient on the marginal tax rates is negative and
statistically signi¯cant: it ranges from -0.434 (with s.e. equal to 0.156) for the labor income
tax to -0.241 (0.094) for the dividend income tax.
To further address the joint determination of taxes and consumption dispersion, we em-
ploy an instrumental variable estimator. It would be particularly useful to look at a measure
of the expected tax system where the expectation depends on the e®ectiveness of the state
15administration in raising tax revenue. We therefore use as instrument a measure of tax
e®ort. For the years up to 1991 the data are available from ACIR (Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, 1993), while subsequent data are taken from Tannenwald
(2002), although it was necessary to linearly interpolate the series for some years.9
The results from the IV estimation are reported in the ¯fth column of Table 4 and imply
that, if any, the endogeneity of taxes biases the results against ¯nding an e®ect of taxes on
consumption dispersion. The coe±cients on the marginal tax rates have negative signs and
are signi¯cant, except that for the dividend income, which is not statistically di®erent from
zero.
As a further check, we use as measure of the marginal income tax the average marginal tax
rate computed using the 1995 nationwide income distribution. This marginal tax measure
changes over time and across states only due to changes in state tax legislation, which we have
seen to evolve di®erently across the di®erent states. The results are reported in Table 5 and
mirror those reported in Table 4. Taxes are negatively related to consumption dispersion in
the baseline regression, in the ¯xed-e®ect regression, in the speci¯cation with time dummies
and with the unemployment rate added, and in the IV regression.
As a further robustness check, and to reduce the in°uence of possible outliers, we use the
interquartile range as an additional measure of the dispersion of non-durable consumption.
The interquartile range is then regressed on our marginal tax measure. For brevity, we focus
on taxes on labor income. The results are shown in Table 6. The upper panel of Table 6 uses
the average marginal tax rate as regressor, computed using the actual within-state income
9For more details on the tax e®ort measure, we refer to Tannenwald (2002).
16distribution, the lower the average marginal tax rate computed using the 1995 nationwide
income distribution. In both panels, the coe±cient in the baseline speci¯cation is reported
in the ¯rst column of Table 6 and is not signi¯cant at the standard level. The lack of
signi¯cance of the labor income tax coe±cient might be due to the baseline regression not
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the state level.
The second column of table 6 runs the ¯xed e®ect estimator and displays sizeable and
statistically signi¯cant coe±cients in the regression of non-durable consumption dispersion
on taxes in the upper (-0.794 with standard error 0.288) and lower panel (-0.970 with s.e.
0.325) of Table 6. The third column corrects for time e®ects by adding year dummies and
show negative and signi¯cant coe±cient of taxes on consumption dispersion. Controlling
for state-speci¯c business cycle e®ects is done in the fourth column, where we add the
unemployment rate to speci¯cation of the third column. The results show that consumption
dispersion is positively related to unemployment and negatively to taxes: in both panels the
coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant. The results from the IV estimation appear in the ¯fth
column of Table 6 and con¯rm that, whatever measure of marginal tax rate one uses, the
e®ect of taxes on consumption dispersion is negative, sizeable and statistically signi¯cant.
In summary, the evidence presented here points towards a negative relation between
taxes and consumption inequality. This ¯nding supports the premise that tax systems might
actually provide insurance to households.
173.2 The distortionary e®ect of taxation
We have repeated all the robustness checks for the negative correlation between taxes and
mean of log consumption. We have re-run the regressions of Table 3, expanding the speci¯-
cation to include state ¯xed e®ects, time e®ects and variables that vary both across states
and over time, such as the unemployment rate. These additional tests do not lend support
for the robustness of a negative correlation between taxes and mean of log consumption.10
Our results about the distortionary e®ect of taxes are consistent with the literature that
has tried to estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate.
This line of research, initiated by studies such as Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995), has
shown how di±cult it is to ¯nd empirically a distortionary e®ect from higher taxation.11
This inconclusiveness is also similar to Backus, Henriksen, and Storesletten (2007), who, in
a di®erent setting, focus on the e®ect of taxes on global capital allocation and ¯nd mixed
evidence on the relation between taxes and capital. We thus leave the investigation of
the possible distortionary e®ect of taxes on consumption as an open question for future
research. It seems that one ¯rst needs to investigate the channels through which taxes a®ect
consumption. Such channels may be hidden behind labor-supply decisions (possibly more
complex in multiple-earner households), behind how consumption responds to transitory or
permanent income innovations, and also behind general-equilibrium e®ects on consumption
10The full set of results is not reported for brevity, but can be provided from the authors upon request.
11For a review and evidence, see Goolsbee (1999), who exploits six decades of tax reforms in the US, and
shows that the distortionary e®ect of taxes is negligible except for that in the eighties. Moreover, Goolsbee
(2000) distinguishes the short from the long run elasticity and shows that the former is larger than 1, the
latter close to zero.
18through interest rates and capital accumulation.
4 Conclusions
When consumers face idiosyncratic and uninsurable income risk marginal income taxes have
two countervailing e®ects: an insurance e®ect and a distortionary e®ect. The ¯rst e®ect is
captured by a negative relationship between taxes and measures of non-durable consumption
dispersion across households. The second e®ect is shown by a negative relationship between
taxes and mean non-durable consumption. Hitherto, however, there has been little empirical
research into whether we can observe either of these e®ects in the data, which is perhaps
surprising given the prominence and vehemence with which these e®ects have been discussed.
This may partly be explained by the di±culty in devising an appropriate test. We have
addressed this issue by investigating the di®erences in the mean and standard deviation of
log non-durable consumption when the marginal income tax rates vary across US states.
Measuring both the tax system and the non-durable consumption dispersion requires using
household level data. We have taken data for income and for consumption from di®erent data
sources to eliminate spurious correlation in the state level tax and consumption measures.
We ¯nd robust evidence supporting the insurance e®ect of taxation on consumption,
starting from a negative correlation between taxes and the standard deviation of log non-
durable consumption. This negative correlation is robust to di®erent controls like unobserved
heterogeneity at the state level, to nationwide and state-speci¯c business cycle e®ects, and
to the potential endogeneity of taxes. On the other hand, we do not ¯nd robust evidence
supporting the distortionary e®ect of taxation. The negative correlation between uncondi-
19tional mean consumption and marginal taxation does not persist under the same sensitivity
tests.
Our ¯ndings emphasize the relevance of models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, such
as, for instance, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Floden (2001), Domeij and Heathcote
(2002), and Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2006), and stress an important issue in the welfare
evaluation of policies ¯nanced through marginal income taxes.
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23Table 1. Income tax rates in the US States
State Tax Rates Exemptions
min. max. single married dependents
Alabama 2.0 5.0 1,500 3,000 300
Alaska no state tax
Arizona 2.87 5.04 2,100 4,200 2,300
Arkansas 1.0 6.5 20* 40* 20*
California 1.0 9.3 80* 160* 251*
Colorado 4.63 4.63 none
Connecticut 3.0 4.5 12,000 24,000 0
Delaware 2.2 5.95 110* 220* 110*
Dist. Columbia 8.7 9.0 1,370 2,740 1,370
Florida no state tax
Georgia 1.0 6.0 2,700 5,400 2,700
Hawaii 1.5 8.25 1,040 2,080 1,040
Idaho 1.6 7.8 3,000 6,000 3,000
Illinois 3.0 3.0 2,000 4,000 2,000
Indiana 3.4 3.4 1,000 2,000 1,000
Iowa 0.36 8.98 40* 80* 40*
Kansas 3.5 6.45 2,250 4,500 2,250
Kentucky 2.0 6.0 20* 40* 20*
Louisiana 2.0 6.0 4,500 9,000 1,000
Maine 2.0 8.5 4,700 7,850 1,000
Maryland 2.0 4.75 2,400 4,800 2,400
Massachusetts 5.0 5.0 4,400 8,800 1,000
Michigan 4.0 4.0 3,000 6,000 3,000
Minnesota 5.35 7.85 3,000 6,000 3,000
Mississippi 3.0 5.0 6,000 12,000 1,000
Missouri 1.5 6.0 2,100 4,200 2,100
Montana 2.0 11.0 1,610 3,220 1,610
Nebraska 2.56 6.84 94* 188* 94*
Nevada no state tax
New Hampshire taxes unearned income only
New Jersey 1.4 6.37 1,000 2,000 1,500
New Mexico 1.7 8.2 3,000 6,000 3,000
New York 4.0 6.85 - - 1,000
North Carolina 6.0 8.25 3,000 6,000 3,000
North Dakota 2.10 5.54 3,000 6,000 3,000
Ohio 0.743 7.5 1,200 2,400 1,200
Oklahoma 0.5 7.0 1,000 2,000 1,000
Oregon 5.0 9.0 145* 290* 145*
Pennsylvania 2.8 2.8 none
Rhode Island 2.5 8.5
South Carolina 2.5 7.0 3,000 6,000 3,000
South Dakota no state tax
Tennessee taxes unearned income only
Texas no state tax
Utah 3.6 7.0 2,250 4,500 2,250
Vermont 3.6 9.5 3,000 6,000 3,000
Virginia 2.0 5.75 800 1,600 800
Washington no state tax
West Virginia 3.0 6.5 2,000 4,000 2,000
Wisconsin 4.6 6.75 700 1,400 400
Wyoming no state tax
Note. *Refers to Tax Credits rather exempt income. The data refer to 2003 and are available from the
Federation of Tax Administrators at 444 N. Capital Street, Washington DC. The `min.' and `max.' refer
to the minimum and maximum tax bracket in the state, `single' and `married' refer to single ¯lers and
households in which the husband and wife jointly ¯le, while `dependents' refer to each additional dependent
person for which the ¯le may claim.
24Table 2. Marginal tax rates on earned and unearned income for US States
State Labor income Interest income Dividend income Pension income
¹ ¿ ¿2003 ¡ ¿1980 ¹ ¿ ¿2003 ¡ ¿1980 ¹ ¿ ¿2003 ¡ ¿1980 ¹ ¿ ¿2003 ¡ ¿1980
Alabama 3.7 0.6 3.3 0.2 3.2 1.8 3.4 0.4
Alaska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Arizona 4.4 -1.4 4.0 -0.9 4.0 -3.8 3.7 -1.5
Arkansas 4.8 1.3 4.4 1.3 5.6 -0.1 2.7 4.0
California 6.8 0.5 6.7 -0.1 7.6 -8.7 5.8 0.7
Colorado 4.8 0.7 4.5 0.4 4.7 -4.4 3.9 0.6
Connecticut 2.7 5.5 3.5 4.4 5.2 -6.2 2.3 4.9
Delaware 6.2 -2.9 5.8 -3.0 5.0 -9.4 4.9 -0.5
District of Columbia 8.7 1.4 8.2 0.8 7.0 -8.8 8.0 1.0
Florida 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Georgia 5.5 0.4 5.1 -0.4 5.2 -5.6 4.9 -0.1
Hawaii 8.4 -1.0 7.7 -1.1 7.9 -8.4 0.1 0.0
Idaho 7.0 0.7 6.4 0.7 6.6 -6.0 6.0 0.1
Illinois 2.8 0.5 2.7 0.3 2.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
Indiana 3.1 1.5 2.9 0.9 2.9 -1.8 2.9 0.7
Iowa 4.5 1.6 5.3 1.3 5.3 -4.2 4.5 2.0
Kansas 5.1 2.1 5.2 1.7 5.3 -3.6 5.4 3.6
Kentucky 4.4 1.4 4.4 1.3 4.6 2.1 3.4 -1.8
Louisiana 2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.8 -1.9 2.1 2.1
Maine 7.0 1.7 6.7 0.1 7.6 -7.2 6.1 -1.4
Maryland 4.8 -0.2 4.6 -0.2 4.6 -4.8 3.8 -0.5
Massachusetts 5.5 0.1 3.3 4.3 3.3 4.1 5.5 0.2
Michigan 4.6 -0.6 4.3 -1.2 4.3 -4.4 2.0 -0.4
Minnesota 7.6 -1.9 7.2 -1.1 7.2 -7.6 6.5 1.6
Mississippi 3.6 1.6 3.4 0.8 4.0 0.5 0.9 -1.6
Missouri 3.9 2.1 4.1 1.5 4.2 -2.9 4.2 2.1
Montana 5.0 0.6 4.8 0.7 5.0 -4.9 5.0 -0.6
Nebraska 4.3 2.2 4.2 1.3 4.5 -6.1 4.3 2.9
Nevada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
New Hampshire 0.0 0.0 4.4 -0.5 4.7 -0.6 0.0 0.0
New Jersey 3.6 2.3 3.4 2.7 3.6 -2.2 2.9 2.1
New Mexico 4.8 2.4 4.6 1.0 5.4 -5.3 5.2 3.2
New York 7.7 -1.5 7.2 -2.8 5.0 -2.0 4.4 1.8
North Carolina 5.8 4.0 6.2 1.7 6.3 -6.1 5.9 2.2
North Dakota 2.9 0.3 3.0 1.0 3.4 -3.0 2.7 1.1
Ohio 4.6 2.7 4.4 2.8 5.0 -2.9 3.9 2.8
Oklahoma 5.7 1.9 4.9 0.3 5.6 1.5 5.0 2.1
Oregon 8.3 1.1 7.5 -0.3 7.6 -8.3 6.9 1.3
Pennsylvania 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.6 2.5 0.4 0.0 0.0
Rhode Island 5.7 0.9 5.5 1.1 6.6 -6.8 4.8 1.0
South Carolina 6.2 0.0 5.5 -1.2 6.0 -6.6 4.8 -1.7
South Dakota 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tennessee 0.0 0.0 5.4 -0.3 5.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0
Texas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Utah 6.1 0.9 5.1 4.0 5.6 -2.9 4.7 3.8
Vermont 5.8 0.0 5.2 -0.1 5.9 -7.6 5.5 1.9
Virginia 5.2 0.8 4.6 -0.1 4.9 -5.7 4.7 0.7
Washington 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
West Virginia 5.0 1.2 4.9 0.9 5.2 -5.1 4.3 2.6
Wisconsin 7.3 -0.9 7.0 -1.1 6.9 -8.2 6.8 2.2
Wyoming 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note. ¹ ¿ is the state marginal tax rate averaged over 1980-2003, ¿1980 is the marginal tax rate in 1980, ¿2003
in 2003.
25Table 3. Baseline results
Labor income Interest income Dividend income Pension income
Mean
constant 5.915 5.907 5.893 5.898
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
¿ -0.687 -0.518 -0.181 -0.372
(0.162)*** (0.179)** (0.162) (0.160)*
Standard deviation
constant 0.581 0.586 0.586 0.585
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
¿ -0.132 -0.258 -0.261 -0.288
(0.065)* (0.071)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)***
Mean
constant 5.915 5.907 5.893 5.898
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
~ ¿ -0.687 -0.518 -0.181 -0.372
(0.162)*** (0.179)** (0.162) (0.160)*
Standard deviation
constant 0.582 0.588 0.586 0.587
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
~ ¿ -0.166 -0.318 -0.253 -0.340
(0.065)* (0.072)*** (0.067)*** (0.063)***
Note. ¿ is the average state marginal tax rate computed using the actual distribution of income within each
state; ~ ¿ is the average state marginal tax rate computed using the 1995 nationwide income distribution.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5% signi¯cant, two 1%, three 0.1%.
26Table 4. Standard deviation of log non-durable consumption
Baseline Fixed e®ect Fixed and time e®ect Unemployment rate IV
Labor income
constant 0.581 0.620 0.569 0.559 0.541
(0.003)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.031)***
¿ -0.132 -1.009 -0.392 -0.434 -1.853
(0.065)* (0.172)*** (0.156)* (0.156)** (0.464)***
u 0.253
(0.110)*
Interest income
constant 0.586 0.598 0.573 0.562 0.723
(0.003)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.077)***
¿ -0.258 -0.739 -0.471 -0.457 -4.289
(0.071)*** (0.139)*** (0.120)*** (0.121)*** (1.551)**
u 0.190
(0.109)
Dividend income
constant 0.586 0.564 0.548 0.537 0.313
(0.003)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.145)*
¿ -0.261 -0.251 -0.249 -0.241 6.013
(0.063)*** (0.090)** (0.094)** (0.094)* (3.264)
u 0.205
(0.109)
Pension income
constant 0.585 0.589 0.556 0.546 0.518
(0.003)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.039)***
¿ -0.288 -0.631 -0.240 -0.271 -3.037
(0.063)*** (0.108)*** (0.128) (0.129)* (0.922)***
u 0.244
(0.110)*
Note. ¿ is the average state marginal tax rate computed using the actual distribution of income within each
state, u is the the unemployment rate. The ¯rst column shows the baseline speci¯cation, the second adds
state ¯xed e®ects, the third year e®ects, the fourth the state unemployment rate and the ¯fth provides the
instrumental variables estimates using as instruments the ACIR tax e®ort measure. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. One star means 5% signi¯cant, two 1%, three 0.1%.
27Table 5. Standard deviation of log non-durable consumption, holding the income distri-
bution ¯xed over time and across states
Baseline Fixed e®ect Fixed and time e®ect Unemployment rate IV
Labor income
constant 0.582 0.637 0.577 0.567 0.540
(0.003)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.031)***
~ ¿ -0.166 -1.255 -0.502 -0.551 -1.762
(0.065)* (0.194)*** (0.177)** (0.178)** (0.430)***
u 0.258
(0.109)*
Interest income
constant 0.588 0.604 0.567 0.556 0.733
(0.003)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.014)*** (0.089)***
~ ¿ -0.318 -0.842 -0.397 -0.372 -5.257
(0.072)*** (0.146)*** (0.131)** (0.132)** (2.117)*
u 0.184
(0.109)
Dividend income
constant 0.586 0.587 0.563 0.551 -0.269
(0.003)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (1.436)
~ ¿ -0.253 -0.582 -0.323 -0.310 21.431
(0.067)*** (0.129)*** (0.112)** (0.112)** (37.140)
u 0.198
(0.109)
Pension income
constant 0.587 0.615 0.545 0.538 0.532
(0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.033)***
~ ¿ -0.340 -0.921 -0.077 -0.138 -2.148
(0.063)*** (0.171)*** (0.160) (0.162) (0.563)***
u 0.235
(0.111)*
Note. ~ ¿ is the average state marginal tax rate computed using the 1995 nationwide income distribution, u
is the the unemployment rate. The ¯rst column shows the baseline speci¯cation, the second adds state ¯xed
e®ects, the third year e®ects, the fourth the state unemployment rate and the ¯fth provides the instrumental
variables estimates using as instruments using as instruments the ACIR tax e®ort measure. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. One star means 5% signi¯cant, two 1%, three 0.1%.
28Table 6. Interquartile range of log non-durable consumption
Baseline Fixed e®ect Fixed and time e®ect Unemployment rate IV
Actual income distribution
constant 0.771 0.765 0.749 0.730 0.651
(0.006)*** (0.024)*** (0.027)*** (0.029)*** (0.059)***
¿ -0.117 -0.794 -0.688 -0.768 -2.355
(0.109) (0.288)** (0.302)* (0.304)* (0.868)**
u 0.488
(0.213)*
1995 nationwide income distribution
constant 0.773 0.777 0.760 0.567 0.540
(0.006)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)*** (0.016)*** (0.031)***
~ ¿ -0.171 -0.970 -0.836 -0.551 -1.762
(0.110) (0.325)** (0.345)* (0.178)** (0.430)***
u 0.258
(0.109)*
Note. ¿ is the average state marginal tax rate on labor income computed using the actual distribution of
income within each state, ~ ¿ is the average state marginal tax rate computed using the 1995 nationwide
income distribution, u is the the unemployment rate. The ¯rst column shows the baseline speci¯cation, the
second adds state ¯xed e®ects, the third year e®ects, the fourth the state unemployment rate and the ¯fth
provides the instrumental variables estimates using as instruments using as instruments the ACIR tax e®ort
measure. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5% signi¯cant, two 1%, three 0.1%.
29Figure 1. State marginal tax rate, labor income, 1980-2003 average
Figure 2. State marginal tax rate, interest income, 1980-2003 average
30Figure 3. State marginal tax rate, dividend income, 1980-2003 average
Figure 4. State marginal tax rate, pension income, 1980-2003 average
31Figure 5. State marginal tax rate, labor income, 1980-2003 changes
32Figure 6. State marginal tax rate, interest income, 1980-2003 changes
Figure 7. State marginal tax rate, dividend income, 1980-2003 changes
33Figure 8. State marginal tax rate, pension income, 1980-2003 changes
Figure 9. Mean of log non-durable consumption
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34Figure 10. Standard deviation of log non-durable consumption
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